Evoking Context with Contrastive Stress: Effects on Pragmatic Enrichment by Chris Cummins & Hannah Rohde
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 26 November 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01779
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1779
Edited by:
Marco Cruciani,
University of Trento, Italy
Reviewed by:
Bob Van Tiel,
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
John Michael Tomlinson,
ZAS Berlin, Germany
*Correspondence:
Chris Cummins
ccummins@staffmail.ed.ac.uk
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Language Sciences,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 14 July 2015
Accepted: 05 November 2015
Published: 26 November 2015
Citation:
Cummins C and Rohde H (2015)
Evoking Context with Contrastive
Stress: Effects on Pragmatic
Enrichment. Front. Psychol. 6:1779.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01779
Evoking Context with Contrastive
Stress: Effects on Pragmatic
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Chris Cummins* and Hannah Rohde
Linguistics and English Language, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Although it is widely acknowledged that context influences a variety of pragmatic
phenomena, it is not clear how best to articulate this notion of context and thereby
explain the nature of its influence. In this paper, we target contextual alternatives
that are evoked via focus placement and test how the same contextual manipulation
can influence three different phenomena that involve pragmatic enrichment: scalar
implicature, presupposition, and coreference. We argue that focus placement influences
these three phenomena indirectly by providing the listener with information about the
likely question under discussion (QUD) that a particular utterance answers (Roberts,
1996/2012). In three listening experiments, we find that the predicted interpretations
are indeed made more available when focus placement is added to the final element
(to the scalar adjective, to an entity embedded under the negated presupposition
trigger, and to the predicate of a pronoun). These findings bring together several distinct
strands of work on the effect of focus placement on interpretation all in the domain of
pragmatic enrichment. Together they advance our empirical understanding of the relation
between focus placement and QUD and highlight commonalities between implicature,
presupposition, and coreference.
Keywords: question under discussion (QUD), scalar implicature, presupposition projection, coreference, focus
placement
INTRODUCTION
The study of pragmatics examines how hearers infer meaning beyond that which is explicitly
expressed by the speaker. This process crucially depends upon the consideration of what is not said
as well as what is said. To take one much-discussed example, quantity implicature has traditionally
been assumed to rely on the hearer’s ability to identify and reason about more informative
alternatives that the speaker could have uttered. For example, a hearer is expected to reason that
a speaker who utters (1) had available to them a stronger statement, as in (2), and that because the
speaker chose not to utter (2), the hearer is entitled to infer the classic scalar implicature from (1),
namely the negation of (2).
(1) Mary saw some of John’s children today.
(2) Mary saw all of John’s children today.
Amajor concern arising from this line of reasoning is what wemean by alternatives that the speaker
“could have uttered.” As Grice (1975) sketched out, we expect that cooperative speakers will adhere
to several principles of interaction. They will not make statements which are false or for which
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they lack evidence, they will produce utterances that are relevant,
they will be concise, and they will make their contribution only as
informative as is required for the current purposes of the dialogue
in which they are engaged.
The net effect of this is to substantially narrow down the
space of alternatives that are pragmatically consequential in a
particular set of circumstances. For instance, implicatures are
predicted not to be available based on informationally stronger
statements about which the speaker is not knowledgeable,
because the speaker could not have made these statements
without violating Grice’s quality maxim—therefore, the speaker’s
unwillingness to utter them is not intended to signal their
falsity.1 Similarly, implicatures should not be available when the
additional information provided by the stronger statement would
have been irrelevant to the current discourse purpose, putatively
because the speaker could not convey this additional information
without violating the maxim of relation. These predictions have
been borne out experimentally (Breheny et al., 2006; Goodman
and Stuhlmüller, 2013).
Nevertheless, as Grice himself acknowledged, the issue of
determining whether or not a potential utterance would have
been relevant to the current discourse purpose, had it been
uttered, is not a straightforward matter. Roberts (1996/2012)
approaches this by appeal to the notion of Question Under
Discussion (QUD), which she defines as the immediate topic
of discussion and which she takes to proffer a set of relevant
alternatives. A felicitous assertion is, on this view, one which
bears upon the QUD by choosing among the alternatives that it
proffers. For instance, a QUD of “How many of John’s children
did Mary see today?” would proffer a set of alternatives including
“some of them” and “all of them,” and both (1) and (2) would
be felicitous responses to this QUD. If that particular question
is indeed the one under discussion, the hearer of (1) is expected
to identify that (2) would have been a felicitous alternative and
(given some additional assumptions) understand (1) to implicate
the negation of (2).
What if the QUD is not explicitly given, though? Roberts
(1996/2012) takes the view that the QUD is often merely implicit
and has to be inferred on the basis of other considerations.
Specifically, she cites the use of prosodic focus as a cue to QUD
in English. As she puts it (2012: 27), “assertions, like questions,
are conventionally associated with a set of alternatives, although
these alternatives are presupposed by the prosody rather than
proferred” (see also Büring, 2003). This proposal develops the
observation of Jackendoff (1972) that the prosody of an assertion
constrains the set of questions to which it could be an answer:
on Roberts’s account, we can go further and use the prosody of
an assertion to identify relevant alternatives that could have been
uttered in place of the actual assertion.
In this paper, we discuss the use of focus marking to
evoke sets of alternatives and experimentally test the impact
of such alternatives on three distinct pragmatic phenomena:
scalar implicature, presupposition cancelation, and coreference.
1Of course, the speaker’s unwillingness to make a stronger statement may have the
effect of signaling their lack of certain knowledge about the truth or falsity of the
stronger statement.
We argue that a QUD-based analysis potentially offers a
unified explanation of what appear, on the surface, to be
very different pragmatic consequences; and we introduce novel
experimental data to show that these effects are indeed evident in
comprehenders’ behavior.
SOME PRAGMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF
FOCUS MANIPULATION
Scalar Implicature
Since Horn (1972), scalar implicatures have been widely
discussed as a special case of quantity implicature. As Geurts
(2010, p. 49) puts it, “the distinctive feature of scalar implicatures
is that we can use lexical substitution to generate the relevant
alternatives from the sentence uttered.” This is evident in the case
of (1) above: the alternative, (2), is generated simply by replacing
the informationally weaker “some” with the stronger “all.” We
can think of <some, all> as constituting an informational scale.
A widespread intuition within the literature is that (at least
some) scales of this form are privileged in terms of their
pragmatics, in that the use of a weak term from one of those
scales robustly tends to implicate the falsity of the corresponding
utterance with any stronger scalemate. Indeed, for cases such
as <some, all>, the inference (that “some” tends to mean “not
all”) is sufficiently robust to have motivated accounts in which
it is generated by default (Levinson, 2000) or is grammaticalised
(Chierchia et al., 2012). From a QUD point of view, we can
understand this observation as a generalization about the kinds
of question to which a weak scalar is an appropriate answer: that
is, whenever a weak scalar is a felicitous answer to a given QUD,
any stronger scalemate would likewise be a felicitous answer.
Consequently, it is generally appropriate for the hearer to embark
on pragmatic reasoning concerning the stronger alternative (thus
deriving the implicature), safe in the knowledge that the stronger
alternative would indeed have been an appropriate thing for the
speaker to have uttered, had the speaker known it to be true.
The extensive recent experimental literature on scalar
implicature has demonstrated that things are not quite so clear-
cut as had previously been supposed. In fact, there is considerable
variability between participants as to whether or not they endorse
scalar inferences such as “some” -> “not all,” with the overall
response rates also depending on task factors (see Katsos and
Bishop, 2011 for a review). A possible explanation for this is
that the tendency of a particular weak scalar to evoke a suitable
context for implicature (i.e., a context in which the stronger
alternative would also have been felicitous) is not necessarily as
strong as had been postulated. This may reflect the fact that,
under certain circumstances, it is possible to use weak scalars in
contexts in which their stronger scalemates are not judged to be
especially relevant, as was shown by Breheny et al. (2006). For
instance, in the context of (3), the use of the weak scalar “or”
[as in (4)] already adequately answers the question of whether
there is at least one person who will be available. The use of
the stronger scalemate “and” [as in (5)] would not necessarily
be warranted, inasmuch as the extra information it conveys is
not essential for the current discourse purpose. Indeed, (5) could
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be altogether less useful than (4), to the extent that it introduces
an ambiguity concerning whether Kate and Rob will be available
separately. Correspondingly, readers/hearers do not tend to infer,
on the basis of (4), that (5) is false.
(3) Can anyone cover for me next week?
(4) Kate or Rob will be available.
(5) Kate and Rob will be available.
Given that scalar implicatures are not obligatory in all contexts,
we can ask whether their availability is sensitive to the kind
of focus manipulation discussed by Roberts (1996/2012). The
intuition is that placing focus on the weak scalar term emphasizes
its potential for being substituted: that is, that the relevant
alternatives to the utterance involve the substitution of some
other lexical item in place of the weak scalar. For instance, by
stressing “some,” we call particular attention to the possibility
that other items such as “all” could be used in its stead,
and consequently feed these into the calculation of potential
pragmatic enrichments. By hypothesis, the use of a weak scalar
already tends to evoke this set of alternatives, but [as shown
by cases such as (4)] this is not invariably the case. We
might therefore expect that placing focus on the weak scalar
will increase the rate at which comprehenders infer scalar
implicatures.
This hypothesis has been partially tested by placing utterances
containing elements from the <or, and> scale (Zondervan,
2006) and the<some, all> scale in contexts in which a preceding
question designates the target utterance’s intended focus
structure (Zondervan et al., 2009). Using dialogue fragments like
(6) and (7), Zondervan et al. show that comprehenders draw
significantly more implicatures (agreeing more often with the
statement that “not all pizzas were delivered”) in the context of
a question that evokes the stronger scalar alternative (6) than one
that does not (7).
(6) A: Were all pizzas delivered?
B: Some pizzas were delivered.
(7) A: Were some pizzas delivered?
B: Some pizzas were delivered.
Intuitively, B’s utterance in (6) has focus on “some,” and would
perhaps most naturally be read aloud with focal stress on that
word, whereas B’s utterance in (7) does not, and would be read
with stress on “were.” The finding therefore coheres with Roberts’
account. However, it should be noted that (6) does not merely
evoke the stronger alternative “all” through the presumed focus
placement in B’s utterance, but explicitly introduces it in A’s
utterance. By contrast, (7) makes no mention of “all.” Moreover,
in (7), B’s utterance is unnecessarily verbose (B could just reply
“yes”), and it seems possible that a reader could doubt B’s full
cooperativity. Therefore, it might be premature to attribute the
difference in judgments between (6) and (7) entirely to focus
considerations.
Recent experimental work points to a role for the combination
of preceding context and explicit manipulations of prosody in the
interpretation of scalar implicatures. DeMarneffe and Tonhauser
(2015) test for effects of prosody in two different contexts
which provide the background against which to interpret a
scalar adjective—either an explicit utterance similar to A’s polar
question in (7) or a preceding statement regarding speaker A’s
commitments. In both contexts, a rise-fall-rise intonation on
B’s subsequent utterance containing the scalar adjective leads
listeners to report stronger degrees of belief in the pragmatically
strengthened meaning compared with a neutral intonation.
However, this leaves open the question of whether prosody
alone can shift the hearer’s understanding of what the preceding
context is likely to contain, in such a way as to influence the
pragmatic interpretation of the utterance. Under a QUD-based
account, this should be possible: an utterance’s prosody is one of
the cues that listeners use to infer what question the utterance
may be a relevant answer to.
As in the case of much of the experimental research on scalar
implicature, the existing work on focus effects has attended to
a limited number of potential scales. More recent work by Van
Tiel et al. (2014) demonstrates substantial variability among
potential implicature scales with respect to the availability of
their corresponding implicatures. They demonstrate that, within
a neutral context, the rates of endorsement of 43 candidate scalar
implicatures ranged from 4% (e.g., “tired” +> “not exhausted”)
to 100% (e.g., “sometimes” +> “not always”), with “some” +>
“not all” very near the top of the range at 96%. This variability
raises the question of whether the effect of focus in promoting
scalar implicature is general across a broad range of triggers.
On the one hand, “some” and “or” (which was not tested by
Van Tiel et al.) may be atypically strong implicature triggers,
and consequently the effect of focus may be particularly clear-
cut in these cases, as the stronger scalar alternatives are especially
susceptible to being evoked. On the other hand, it is possible
that “some” and “or” could be influenced less by the presence
of focus, as they already evoke the stronger scalar alternatives
to the fullest extent possible even without additional stress being
introduced.
Experiment 1 of this paper evaluates the availability of a
variety of different scalar implicatures, using intonation to signal
focus placement on a weak scalar. The study goes beyond prior
work that has manipulated the preceding context against which
a scalar is interpreted (Zondervan et al., 2009; de Marneffe and
Tonhauser, 2015). If hearers can instead make use of focus
placement on an utterance in isolation to recover a likely QUD
that is operative in the context, that QUD and the set of
alternatives it evokes is predicted to influence the perceived
availability of the scalar implicature.
As we will show, this prediction is borne out. However, the
finding follows from the fact that scalar implicatures necessarily
depend on the presence of alternatives (“scalemates”). Arguably
a more substantive result would be a demonstration that the
manipulation of focus influences scale-independent pragmatic
phenomena. To that end, we next consider presupposition and
coreference.
Presupposition Cancellation
The tendency of content to project from under the scope of
negation has long been identified as diagnostic of presupposition,
as opposed to other forms of non-asserted content. For instance,
both (8) and its negation (9) presuppose (10). By appeal to
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accommodation, either (8) or (9) can be used to convey the fact
of (10) to a hearer who was not previously aware of it.
(8) John quit smoking.
(9) John didn’t quit smoking.
(10) John smoked, at some point prior to the time of utterance.
Nevertheless, it is quite possible for a presupposition under the
scope of negation to be canceled, or to fail to project to the
discourse level. (11) is an apparently felicitous example.
(11) John didn’t quit smoking—he never smoked in the first
place.
In principle, the acceptability of (11) suggests that the hearer
is confronted with a difficult problem when she encounters an
utterance like (9)—should the presupposition (10) be added to
her discourse model, even though this might turn out to be an
erroneous inference? Or should she wait until it is made clear
whether or not the speaker intends to communicate (10)? This
puzzle appears to vitiate the communicative benefits of being able
to exploit accommodation to convey a presupposition.
It may be possible to solve this puzzle by appeal to the notion
of QUD. An utterance like (11), in which a presupposition is
apparently triggered (in this case, by the use of “quit”) and
then canceled, may suggest the presence of a current QUD
that already assumes that presupposition. For (11), the QUD
appears to be something like “Did John quit smoking?” The
set of proffered answers then effectively comprises (8) and (9),
both of which contain the presupposition trigger “quit,” and the
speaker’s subsequent utterance of one of them does not constitute
an attempt to convey the presupposition. If the hearers are aware
of, or can infer, the existence of such a QUD, then they should not
take the speaker’s utterance of “quit” as necessarily committing
the speaker to the belief that John used to smoke. By contrast,
an utterance like (9) is potentially compatible with a wider range
of QUDs (for example, “What did John do after he saw his
doctor?”), some of which proffer alternatives that do not involve
the presupposition trigger “quit.” The subsequent use of “quit”
thus represents the outcome of a choice on the part of the speaker,
and consequently has the potential to convey meaning (i.e., the
presupposition).
How might focus effects come into play here? A speaker who
utters (9) neutrally, or placing stress on “didn’t,” seems merely
to evoke an alternative such as (8). This is compatible with a
situation in which the QUD is “Did John quit smoking?” and the
speaker does not wish to challenge the presupposition. However,
a speaker who utters (9) but places focal stress on “John” appears
to give rise to a different set of alternatives, involving all the
people who might have quit smoking. This kind of focus appears
to suggest a continuation such as (11) or (12).
(12) JOHN didn’t quit smoking—you’re thinking of Bill.
As far as the QUD is concerned, focus on “John” suggests that it is
likely to be of the form “Who (didn’t) quit smoking?” There is still
a presupposition built into this question, namely that someone
(in the universe of discourse) used to smoke at some point prior
to the time of utterance, but the specific presupposition that John
used to smoke is now absent.
The story is similar if stress is placed on “smoking.” In this
case, the implied QUD is “What did John quit doing?” and
the alternatives are the things that John might have quit (e.g.,
“drinking”). Again, the QUD encompasses a presupposition that
John used to do something (of interest to the discourse purpose),
but not specifically that he used to smoke.
If this line of reasoning is correct, then the hearer’s inference
from (9) to (10)—the projection of the presupposition from
under the scope of negation to the discourse level—relies upon
the assumption that (9) answers a QUD that presupposes (10).
This inference will therefore be obstructed if focus is placed on
“John” or “smoking.” In either case, the hearer will be encouraged
to infer a QUD which does not presuppose (10), and hence
not project the presupposition. This observation and variants of
the QUD-based analysis have been outlined in similar form in
several recent papers (Beaver and Clark, 2008; Cummins, 2014;
Simons et al., to appear). Experiment 2 tests these predictions
experimentally. As in our first experiment, Experiment 2
manipulates focus placement to influence the QUD a hearer
infers, and as we show, this manipulation in turn modulates the
projection of the presupposition from under negation.
We now turn to a phenomenon that is known to be sensitive
to QUD but that has not been typically analyzed alongside
implicature or presupposition: pronoun interpretation.
Coreference
Assigning reference to pronouns gives rise to ambiguity in cases
such as (15), where more than one suitable potential referent is
present in the preceding context.
(15) Mary scolded Sue. She praised Bob.
An extensive literature posits a number of factors that
comprehenders bring to bear on the process of pronoun
interpretation. Some factors are taken to reflect surface
structure—e.g., a preference for antecedents in subject position
or a preference for grammatical role parallelism (Sheldon, 1974;
Smyth, 1994; Stevenson et al., 1994). Other factors reflect deeper
properties of the utterance such as the lexical semantics of the
verb or its thematic role assignments (Caramazza et al., 1977;
Stevenson et al., 1994; Arnold, 2001). An alternative approach
(Hobbs, 1979; Kehler, 2002; Kehler et al., 2008) argues that
such preferences emerge as a by-product of reasoning about the
most likely interpretation of an utterance in relation to adjacent
utterances. These intersentential relationships can be understood
either as coherence relations or as QUDs which can influence
pronoun interpretation (Rohde, 2008; Kehler and Rohde, under
review).
In many discourse contexts, all of these approaches make the
same prediction regarding a pronoun’s preferred interpretation.
However, an example like (15) reveals key differences and allows
us to highlight the role of the inferred QUD. While parallelism
and subjecthood preferences both favor the interpretation of
“she” in (15) as referring to Mary, the status of the verb “scold” as
a member of the class of so-called NP2-biased Implicit Causality
(IC) verbs is posited to yield a preference for Sue, the referent
filling the patient thematic role and appearing in object position
(Garvey and Caramazza, 1974; Brown and Fish, 1983; Au, 1986;
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McKoon et al., 1993; Koornneef and van Berkum, 2006). This
difference is unsurprising if the preferred interpretation of the
pronoun is understood to depend on the coherence relation that
is inferred to hold between the two sentences (Kehler et al., 2008).
If the second sentence in (15) serves as an explanation of the
first, then the combination of the lexical semantics of “scold”
and the causal coherence relation yields a preference to interpret
“she” as the causally implicated referent of a scolding event,
namely the scoldee, Sue (i.e., Mary scolded Sue because sheSue
praised Bob). In this case, we are led to assume some set of
circumstances under which, fromMary’s point of view, the action
of praising Bob is worthy of reproach. This is taken to be a more
plausible state of affairs than a reading in which Mary praising
Bob (sheMary praised Bob) stands as an explanation for Mary
scolding Sue (although we might be able to imagine contexts
in which this is conceivable). If instead the second sentence is
interpreted to be relevant to the first via a discourse relation
centered on parallelism, then what is important is the similarity
of the entities and actions in the two sentences, e.g., Mary as the
Agent of the scolding event (and the subject of the first sentence)
can be mapped to Mary as the Agent of the praising event (and
the subject of the second sentence), with Sue and Bob as the
respective Patients. The fact that “scold” and “praise” are both
members of the class of agent-patient IC verbs while differing
in affect supports the inference of a contrast relation (i.e., Mary
scolded Sue, but sheMary praised Bob).
The different interpretations of (15) seem to suggest the
existence of different QUDs. Under the parallel interpretation,
both sentences can naturally be construed as partial answers
to a single QUD “What did Mary do?” Under the causal
interpretation of (15), the sentences, respectively, answer two
distinct QUDs to the effect of “What did Mary do?” and “Why
did she do that?”
On this analysis, we would again predict that the interpretative
preference for the pronoun would be influenced by the presence
of focal stress in the second sentence. Suppose that stress is placed
on the word “Bob” in (15). For the same reasons discussed earlier,
this suggests that the QUD in effect at the second sentence is
“Who did X praise?,” where X denotes the referent of “she,” i.e.,
Mary or Sue. If X = “Mary,” then the question that the second
sentence partially answers is “Who did Mary praise?,” which is a
subquestion of “What did Mary do?,” which in turn is the QUD
most likely to be operable for the first sentence. By contrast,
if X = “Sue,” the second sentence partially answers “Who did
Sue praise?,” which is not a subquestion of “What did Mary
do?” Moreover, it is not transparently a subquestion of “Why
did Mary scold Sue?,” although it could be interpreted as such
under some additional assumptions. It is not, after all, a likely
state of affairs that Mary scolding Sue was caused by Sue praising
anyone (though the fact that one may attempt to formulate such
a scenario is a testament to the bias in favor of causal coherence
relations following IC verbs). A similar argument applies if focal
stress is placed on “praised”: again, if “she” refers to Mary, the
second sentence is a partial answer to the first sentence’s likely
QUD, whereas if “she” refers to Sue it is not.
In summary, then, on QUD grounds, we would expect the
placement of stress on “praised” or “Bob” in the second sentence
of (15) to promote the parallel interpretation, in which the
pronoun refers to the subject, Mary, over a causal interpretation,
in which the pronoun refers to the object, Sue. A similar
theoretical case is made by Kehler (2005) for differences in
the interpretation of an ambiguous pronoun depending on
the coherence relation that is inferred to hold between two
adjacent clauses, although in Kehler’s example [see (16)], subject
coreference is favored by the causal coherence relation and object
coreference by parallelism.
(16) Powell defied Cheney, and Bush punished him.
Kehler argues that the parallel interpretation is associated with
accent placement on each word of the second clause, whereas
the causal interpretation leaves the final word unaccented. Focus
marking is thus predicted to influence the inferred relation or
question under discussion. Experiment 3 uses IC contexts to test
the prediction that accent placement can guide listeners’ inferred
relation, which in turn has repercussions for coreference. We
replicate the widely reported NP2 bias (for pronoun coreference
with the object of NP2-biased verbs) and present the first
experimental evidence of this novel effect showing that IC biases
are reduced when there is focus placement on the predicate of the
subsequent clause.
Interim Summary
We have argued in the preceding subsections that the
same form of manipulation—introducing focal stress on a
particular constituent—should have pragmatic consequences of
an apparently diverse nature across a range of structures. In
the case of scalar implicatures, we argue that focusing a weak
scalar term should increase the availability of the implicature,
although the effect of this may vary between scales. In the case of
presupposition, we argue that focusing any of various arguments
of a presupposition trigger may result in the presupposition being
less likely to project from under the scope of negation. And in
the case of pronominal coreference, we argue that focusing the
predicate of a subject-pronominal sentence is likely to promote
a parallel interpretation of the pronoun over alternative causal
readings. All of these consequences flow naturally from a view
in which focus presupposes a set of alternatives, as argued by
Roberts (1996/2012). The following sections present a short series
of experimental studies designed to test these predictions.
Before we proceed, it is worth asking why these three
phenomena have not previously been linked together via QUD.
This may reflect a difference in emphasis over the fields’
histories and their treatment of literal and inferred meaning.
On the one hand, work on implicature has assumed that the
literal message is easy to identify and that complexity emerges
in the subsequent calculation of what is meant beyond that
literal meaning. Likewise, in the case of presupposition and
presupposition accommodation, the emphasis has been placed
on identifying what additional meaning is at stake given the
words used to convey a particular literal message. On the other
hand, coreference models typically target the ambiguity in the
literal message, specifically concerning which individual in the
available set of entities in the preceding context is most likely
to be referenced here. This in turn depends on inferences about
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the operative coherence relation. Only recently have these three
areas been analyzed in terms of QUD. Pronouns historically were
modeled primarily in terms of entity salience (see Ariel, 1990;
Gundel et al., 1993; Arnold, 2001) and more rarely in terms of
QUDs or coherence relations (Winograd, 1972; Hobbs, 1979;
Kehler, 2002). Work in implicature and presuppositions has only
recently focused on the importance of QUD (Breheny et al., 2006;
Beaver and Clark, 2008; Zondervan et al., 2009; Cummins, 2014;
de Marneffe and Tonhauser, 2015; Simons et al., to appear). Our
studies represent the inevitable convergence of these separate
research strands.
EXPERIMENT 1: SCALAR IMPLICATURE
This experiment uses a rating task to test the hypothesis that the
availability of scalar implicatures is sensitive to QUD, as evoked
via focus placement. Participants listen to sentences containing
weak scalars in two conditions (neutral vs. focus) and then
answer a question about the status of a stronger statement. The
design is a within-participants and within-items manipulation.
Participants
Seventy-seven English-speaking participants were recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turk, location restricted to the
United States. After eliminating data from 12 bilinguals and
5 participants who failed to complete the task, data from
60 monolingual participants remained for the main analysis.
Participants were paid between $1.80 and $2.50.
For this and the subsequent experiments, each participant
was provided in advance with information about the procedure
and gave informed consent. The experiments were conducted
in accordance with the University of Edinburgh’s ethics policy
and the UKRIO Code of Practice for Research, and under the
oversight of the departmental Ethics committee.
Materials
Target stimuli consisted of 20 recorded sentences, each
containing a weak scalar in sentence-final position, as in (17),
interleaved with 20 sentences for Experiment 2. The full stimuli
set is listed in Appendix A.2
(17) The view from the hotel window is pretty.
The target sentences were recorded in two conditions: neutral
intonation and focus placement on the scalar. The stimuli were
recorded by a native speaker of English (the first author of this
paper). Note that any variability in the recordings of these two
conditions would serve only to reduce our ability to observe a
difference between conditions.
The experiment consisted of 40 items: The 20 target items for
Experiment 1 were intermixed with 20 items for Experiment 2,
which were likewise one-sentence items with variable intonation.
Procedure
Participants accessed the experiment via a website linked within
Mechanical Turk. Each participant listened to all 20 sentences,
2The recordings of the target stimuli for all three experiments are available here:
http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/ds/315.
half in the neutral intonation condition and half in the
focus placement condition. Across participants, each sentence
appeared in both conditions. Participants were asked to listen to
the sentence and answer a question about the speaker’s intended
meaning on a scale of 1 to 7. The text showing the question was
visible on the screen during and after playback of the recorded
sentence. Participants could replay the sentence as many times
as they wished. Each item appeared on a page by itself, with a
radio-button interface for participants to record their rating.
For the Experiment 1 target items, the question asked about
a relevant stronger scalemate: For example, the question for the
recording of (17) was (18), with answer “1” labeled as “unlikely”
and “7” labeled as “likely.
(18) How likely is it that the view is not gorgeous?
The task took roughly 20min.
Results
We modeled the ratings using a mixed-effect linear regression
with a fixed effect of condition. All models reported in this paper
contain random participant-specific and item-specific intercepts
and slopes where permitted by the data (Barr et al., 2013). As
predicted, participants endorsed the stronger statement (“not
gorgeous”) more in the focus condition (mean = 5.05) than
the neutral condition (mean = 4.74), showing a main effect of
condition (β = 0.26, t = 2.707). We conducted a likelihood-
ratio test between mixed-effects models differing only in the
presence or absence of the fixed main effect of condition. The
model comparison showed a main effect of condition (p < 0.05,
1 d.f.). Figure 1 shows the difference between ratings in the focus
placement and neutral conditions, broken down by item.3
EXPERIMENT 2: PRESUPPOSITION
This experiment uses a rating task to test the hypothesis that
the projection of a presupposition under negation is sensitive to
QUD, again evoked via focus placement. Participants listen to
sentences containing presupposition triggers in two conditions
(neutral vs. focus) and then answer a question about the status of
the presupposition.
Participants
Because the Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 stimuli were
interleaved in a single task, the same participants from
Experiment 1 also completed this experiment.
Materials
Target stimuli consisted of 20 recorded sentences, each
containing a presupposition trigger, as in (19), in either a neutral
3One of our reviewers points out that the direction of the scale may not be obvious
for the items “delayed” (“not on time” vs. “not canceled”) and “smoldering” (“not
alight” vs. “not out”). The participants in the experiment were asked how likely
it was that the “train was not canceled” and “the fire was not out,” respectively.
Removing those two items does not affect the overall analysis: The main effect of
intonation is still significant. Note that “smoldering,” which is arguably the harder
one to identify its pragmatically strengthened meaning, is shown in Figure 1 to be
the worst performing item, so it is possible that asking the question differently
(“how likely was it that the fire was not alight?”) might have yielded different
responses.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1779
Cummins and Rohde Effects of Contrastive Stress on Pragmatic Enrichment
FIGURE 1 | Endorsement of pragmatic meaning for weak scalars in Experiment 1, by item.
or focus condition. The focus condition placed a pitch accent on
the last word of the sentence. This word was either part of an
embedded clause under a factive trigger (e.g., be sorry that the
jewels were in the SAFE) or was otherwise within the scope of the
trigger by being mentioned as part of an argument of a trigger
verb (e.g., return to a job at CHRYSLER) or as an adjunct (e.g.,
finish a degree at HARVARD).
(19) Bill doesn’t regret arguing with his boss.
Procedure
The procedure is described in Experiment 1 above. For the
Experiment 2 target items, the question asked directly about the
presupposition: For example, the question for the recording of
(19) was (20), with answer “1” labeled as “unlikely” and “7”
labeled as “likely.
(20) How likely is it that Bill argued with his boss?
Results
As predicted, participants gave lower ratings to the presupposed
statement (“Bill argued with his boss”) in the focus condition
(mean = 5.97) than the neutral condition (mean = 6.15). As in
Experiment 1, we modeled the ratings using a mixed-effect linear
regression with a fixed effect of condition. The effect of condition
(β = 0.20, t = 2.30) was significant under model comparison
(p < 0.05, 1 d.f.). Figure 2 shows the difference between ratings
in the focus placement and neutral conditions, broken down by
item.
EXPERIMENT 3: COREFERENCE
This experiment uses a pronoun interpretation task to test the
hypothesis that coreference is sensitive to QUD, again evoked via
focus placement. Participants listen to two-sentence discourses
containing in ambiguous pronoun. The second sentence varies
between a neutral condition and a focus condition.
Participants
Seventy-five English-speaking participants were recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turk, location restricted to the
United States. Data was eliminated from seven bilinguals and
three participants who either did not complete or did not
understand the task. Participants were paid between $1.25 and
$2.00.
Materials
Target stimuli consisted of 16 recorded passages, as in (21). The
first sentence mentioned two referents in a situation described
with an NP2-biased IC verb. The two referents were of the same
gender, counterbalanced between male and female names. The
second sentence started with an ambiguous pronoun followed
by a continuation that was intended to be plausible under either
interpretation of the pronoun.
(21) Charles congratulated Simon. He had criticized Stephanie.
The passage varied between a neutral condition and a focus
condition. The focus condition was uttered with the intention
of conveying that the two sentences both provided answers to
a question about what the first referent had done. For this
manipulation to work, the preferred pronoun interpretation with
neutral intonation must be to the non-subject. That is precisely
why the class of NP2-biased IC verbs provides an ideal test
case.
The target stimuli were interleaved with 16 fillers that were
produced with either neutral or focus-marked intonation.
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FIGURE 2 | Endorsement of the presupposed proposition in Experiment 2, by item.
Procedure
Participants were asked to listen to a sentence and answer a
question about the speaker’s intended meaning in the provided
text box. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the text showing the
question was visible on the screen during and after playback of
the recorded sentence, and participants could replay the sentence
as many times as they wished.
For the Experiment 3 target items, the question asked who
did the action described in the second sentence: For example, the
question for the recording of (21) was (22).
(22) Who criticized Stephanie?
The task took roughly 15min.
Results
Responses to target items were coded as SUBJECT [e.g., an answer
of “Charles” to (22)], OBJECT (“Simon”), or UNKNOWN (e.g.,
“the teacher”). The responses to filler trials were also coded and
used to determine which participants to exclude from analysis.
Odd responses were taken to indicate that a participant might
not have been paying sufficient attention or might not have been
able to hear the audio sufficiently well. For example, a participant
presented with a filler like “Paul leaned across the table toward
Stacie. He then asked her to marry him.” who answered the
question of “Who proposed?” with “Stacie” had that answer
coded as an outlier (misinterpreting “he” as “she”). Likewise,
a participant presented with a filler like “Vicki is attracted to
Dennis. He is repulsed by her.” who answered the question
“Who is repulsed?” with “Becky” had that answer coded as
an outlier (mishearing Vicki as Becky). After eliminating the
14 participants with 2 or more outlier answers on filler trials,
data from 50 participants remained for the analysis. Responses
categorized as UNKNOWN (0.5% of target trials) were also
removed.
In keeping with previous studies on NP2-biased IC verbs,
participants favored the object as the referent of the pronoun
(62% object coreference overall). As predicted, however,
pronouns were interpreted to refer to the subject more often in
the focus condition (mean = 41%) than the neutral condition
(mean= 35%). A mixed-effect logistic regression showed a main
effect of condition (β = −0.47, p < 0.05, based on the Wald
Z statistic; Agresti, 2002). Figure 3 shows the difference between
ratings in the focus placement and neutral conditions, broken
down by item.
DISCUSSION
The results of our experiments broadly support our hypothesis
that focus-driven pragmatic effects would be observable in all
three domains of interest. In the case of scalar implicature, we
see a general tendency for focus marking of the weak scalar
to promote interpretations involving the implicature. In the
case of presupposition, focus marking within the presupposed
material—under the scope of negation—tends to promote
interpretations in which the presupposition fails to project to the
discourse level. In the case of subject pronoun disambiguation,
focus marking on the sentential object tends to promote parallel
interpretations of the pronoun.
As explored earlier, all these patterns are explicable in terms
of QUD effects. This relies crucially upon the assumption that
the intonation employed as an indicator of focus structure in
the materials used is actually used by hearers as an indication
of which QUD is currently in play. In principle, this appears to
be a reasonable assumption: Most and Saltz (1979) documented
experimentally that hearers were able to infer the questions to
which differently-intoned sentences were answers. It is important
to reiterate that our materials were not constructed in such a way
as to control their prosodic properties: the sentences were merely
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FIGURE 3 | Subject coreference in Experiment 3, by item.
read by a native speaker who was trying to convey an intended
meaning as opposed to trying to realize a specific contour.
Consequently, we are not licensed to draw precise conclusions
about the relationships between prosody, focus, and QUD. We
can, however, conclude that a purely intonational manipulation
that targets a particular constituent can have pragmatic effects on
the hearers which are predictable under a QUD-based account.
The observed effects are in keeping with existing work
showing that focus factors matter to interpretation by activating
alternatives. Such effects have been demonstrated for the
inclusive/exclusive interpretation of “or” (Chevallier et al., 2008,
2010) and for the exhaustivity inferences of “only” and the
additive presuppositions “also” (Gotzner and Spalek, 2014;
see also Tomlinson and Bott, 2013). With respect to scalar
implicatures, our work complements ongoing research on the
role of prosody in such contexts: results reported by de Marneffe
and Tonhauser (2015) demonstrate that a specific prosodic
contour can increase the availability of scalar implicatures
compared to a neutral intonation contour, although the effect
that they document is evident when the discourse context is
also provided. As de Marneffe and Tonhauser note, this suggests
that the prosodic influence on implicature is a more complex
matter than simply whether or not the weak scalar receives
a pitch accent, as this was the case for the all the conditions
in their experiment. This in turn suggests an important role
for research on scalar implicatures using auditory stimuli,
as the kind of intonation contour inferred by a participant
reading written stimuli cannot always be determined with
confidence.
Regarding the mechanisms by which hearers generate
pragmatic enrichments, there are several possibilities that are
compatible with the kinds of pragmatic enrichments that we
observe. For the much-discussed case of scalar implicature,
possible strategies include interpreting the weak scalar as
semantically (or typically—see Geurts and van Tiel, 2013)
excluding the possibility that the strong scalar holds, or inserting
a tacit exhaustivity operator over the scalar when parsing the
sentence (Chierchia et al., 2012). Compared to these options, the
QUD-based account appears computationally more laborious,
and is more in keeping with the traditional Gricean approach
to quantity implicatures. However, explaining the effect of focus
within these other approaches is perhaps not so straightforward:
we would have to construe it as inducing either a particular
interpretative preference or a particular parsing preference at the
weak scalar term itself. Consequently, it seems plausible to treat
the patterns observed in this experiment as supportive of the
QUD-based model.
There are similarly several different routes by which a
given presupposition can project to the discourse level, as
discussed earlier in this paper. On one account, the hearer adds
the presupposition to her discourse model immediately upon
encountering the trigger, even if it occurs under the scope of
negation; but this proposal runs into difficulty in cases of local
accommodation (i.e., where the presupposition turns out not to
be intended by the speaker). Another possibility is that the hearer
considers whether the QUD that they infer on the basis of the
utterance carries the presupposition, and if so, this enables them
to project the presupposition from under the scope of negation.
Still another possibility arises for a particular class of utterances
with presupposition triggers, as in the case of (23), contrasted
here with (24).
(23) Mary doesn’t regret that the Tories won the election.
(24) Mary doesn’t regret arguing with her boss.
If “Mary” is stressed in (24), a possible interpretation is that
it is someone other than Mary who regrets arguing with their
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boss. Under this interpretation, (24) does not convey that Mary
argued with her boss: indeed, it does not convey that anyone
argued with Mary’s boss, although it does convey that someone
argued with his or her own boss (which may or may not be
the same individual as Mary’s boss). By contrast, applying the
same reasoning to (23), the utterance may convey that someone
other than Mary regrets that the Tories won the election, and
this in turn requires it to be the case that the Tories won the
election. In effect, it appears possible that the utterance with focal
stress triggers some kind of ad hoc implicature which in turn
introduces a presupposition into the hearer’s discourse model.4
In the examples tested in this paper, this possibility does not
arise, but the prediction would be that focal stress on “Mary”
shouldmake no difference to the projection of the presupposition
in (23).
CONCLUSION
The three experiments reported here test how a manipulation
of focus placement can influence three phenomena that involve
pragmatic enrichment, all of which are sensitive to the QUD
evoked by the context. Unlike previous work that has explicitly
manipulated the previous context, here it is the focus placement
itself that informs the listener about the possible QUD to which
the current sentence may be an answer. The repercussions of
this QUD manipulation can be seen in three different types
of pragmatic enrichment: scalar inference, the projection of
presupposition from under negation, and the identification of
a referent for an ambiguous pronoun. In each case, focus
placement signals what QUD is likely and that QUD in
turn determines the relevance of a particular proposition for
4This inference requires the speaker to be knowledgeable; the assumption would
be that such a speaker, knowing that no-one (of interest) argued with their boss [in
(B)] or that the Tories didn’t win the election [in (A)], would say so.
the interpretation of the target sentence. For scalar implicature,
highlighting the relevance of an unstated alternative that is
informationally stronger is found to heighten the availability of
the implicature. For presupposition, highlighting the relevance
of an alternative which does not itself carry the presupposition
reduces projection. For coreference, highlighting the relevance
of a particular alternative favors the inference of a parallel
coherence relation between two adjacent sentences, thereby
disfavoring coreference with the referent picked out by causal
reasoning. Together, these experiments show that a single
manipulation can influence a varied set of phenomena. Our
findings suggest that the study of context can and should
move beyond ad hoc explanations for specific readings and
toward the identification of cues that alter context in systematic
ways. Of course not all context-driven effects depend on focus
placement, but the results reported here offer a first step toward
a necessary inventory of targeted contextual manipulations that
guide listeners’ interpretations.
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